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Abstract 
 
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is a de facto regional power in the Arab world. 
Its role has been crucial in  some of the outcomes of the Arab Spring. The GCC 
countries have been very  pragmatic in dealing with the uprisings, avoiding any 
revolutionary  spill-over  throughout the Gulf region.  This paper examines to what 
extent the policies of the European Union (EU) in the Gulf have changed since the 
beginning of the Arab  Spring.  It argues  that despite the calls by the European 
Parliament and by  the High Representative Baroness Ashton to improve the 
relationship, the EU’s support for a new policy in the Gulf after the Arab Spring is 
stalling, and little new or concrete has been achieved. The paper concludes that the 
Union  needs a reinforced partnership that merges  the various EU policies in the 
region into a single strategic partnership with the Arab countries. 
 Cono Giardullo 
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Introduction: a unique chance for the EU to develop a strategic partnership 
 
“A  deeper relationship also means an open one and means 
honest discussions on issues where we may of course have 
different perspectives. We did that today, and we will continue 
to do that in the future.”1 
 
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), established in 1981, is a de facto  regional 
power in the Arab world. It plays an increasing role in assessing and determining the 
outcomes of the Arab Spring in Syria, Bahrain and Yemen and has already played a 
fundamental role in Libya. This paper examines the European Union’s policies vis-à-vis 
the GCC countries since the beginning of the Arab uprisings in December 2010. At 
the EU-GCC Joint Council in 2012, Baroness Ashton, the EU’s High Representative of 
the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, called for a “more strategic, more 
dynamic” relationship between the two regional organizations following the events 
of the Arab Spring.2 A closer bond could potentially help in dealing with issues that 
are important to the future of both parties, such as energy supply, regional security 
and diplomatic progress in the Middle East peace process.  Therefore,  this paper 
addresses the extent to which  EU policies in the Gulf have changed since the 
beginning of the Arab Spring.  
 
The EU has neglected the Gulf region for many years. Today, new momentum has 
been gained, as the Arab population rebelled against long-standing dictators. The 
Gulf countries have increased their influence in the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) region. The EU needs to be aware of this and foster its relations with the 
GCC. The European Union has a unique opportunity to develop a new approach 
toward the GCC, not only in economic terms, but also with regard to a more intense 
political dialogue.  However,  despite this  ‘window of opportunity’ and the calls to 
improve the relationship, a EU  new policy in the Gulf after the Arab Spring is still 
pending. This paper argues that in the long term a strategic partnership seems the 
only path suitable to merge the various EU policies in the region into  a single 
partnership with Arab countries. Nevertheless, the EU’s support for such an approach 
is stalling, notwithstanding the European Parliament’s  frequent calls  for a  closer 
relationship.    
                                                 
1 European Union, Remarks by High Representative Catherine Ashton following the 22nd EU-
GCC Joint Council and Ministerial Meeting, Luxembourg, 25 June 2012, p. 2. 
2 Ibid., p. 1. BRIGG Paper 3/2012 
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The structure of this paper is as follows. First, it identifies the increasing role of the Gulf 
countries  on the international scene, in particular Saudi Arabia, the  United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) and Qatar, in the last few years. The GCC is intervening with more 
consistency in regional  questions  and it is gaining international recognition for its 
engagement. Long-standing political and economic interests lie behind these 
commitments. Second, the paper assesses the EU’s need for a new Gulf Strategy 
based on an analysis of the main strategic concerns and priorities for the EU, 
including the EU-GCC Free Trade Agreement (FTA) which is still under negotiation.  
 
What makes the Gulf count? 
 
This section aims to define the enhanced role acquired by the GCC countries on the 
international scene.  
 
New challenges for the Gulf countries 
 
On 25 May 1981, the Gulf Cooperation Council Charter was signed in Abu Dhabi.3 
Dugulin argues that one of the main reasons for its establishment was the necessity to 
create a “safer regional environment so that the core existence of the State is not 
compromised by outside threats” following the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran war.4 The 
petro-monarchies had many common features that distinguished them from other 
countries in the region. Yemen, Iraq and Iran were kept out of the new regional 
organization. All six countries are oil producers, they are absolute monarchies and 
they are Arabs and Muslims, with a majority of Sunnis (except Bahrain, but the island 
has always felt the influence of Saudi Arabia).5 
 
While the security element has always been a vital feature of GCC integration, at 
least two other important pillars of the project should be taken into account: a) the 
enhancement of “domestic well-being both through long-term economic develop-
ment, sustaining the upward evolution of the nations’ standard of living, and the 
                                                 
3 The Charter was signed by the six monarchs of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia 
and the United Arab Emirates. R. Dugulin, A Neighborhood Policy for the Gulf Cooperation 
Council, Dubai, Gulf Research Center, 2010, p. 9; B. Khader, L’Europe et les pays arabes du 
Golfe – des partenaires distants, Paris, Public – Quorum – Cermac, 1994, p. 39. 
4 Dugulin, op.cit., p. 9. 
5 Khader, op.cit., p. 40. Cono Giardullo 
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protection of national values and traditions”, and b) the establishment of “a strong 
regional club able to respond to local threats and changes on the world scene”.6  
 
Today, the  role  of the GCC has been advanced considerably. It  is not passively 
waiting to “respond to local threats and changes”.7 On the economic side, the GCC 
has until a few years ago been an authentic success. In 2003, the GCC countries set 
up a customs union8 “in order to facilitate intra-GCC flow of goods and creating a 
collective negotiating power”. 9  Many difficult tasks still  lay ahead  such as 
establishing a monetary union and a single currency. Although the GCC agreed on 
the location of the Monetary Board in Riyadh, in May 2009, these ambitious goals 
have been postponed.10  
 
Cooperation in the area of military and external policy was established in 1982 with 
the creation of the “Al-Jazeerah Shield Joint Forces”, followed by the signing of the 
GCC Joint Defence Agreement in 2000. With regards to cooperation in the field of 
human and environmental affairs, the official documents do not mention a specific 
field of cooperation or related projects in the field of human  rights,  good 
governance or democratization. 
  
Notwithstanding its strengths and weaknesses, the GCC has been an oasis of peace 
– when compared to the surrounding region – and the “only functioning sub-regional 
integration project in the Arab world”.11 The uprisings in the Arab region and the 
persistent challenges to the legitimacy of the eight remaining monarchies in the 
region12 are seriously worrying the GCC states. All six GCC states have poor human 
rights records. Freedom House has constantly placed five of them in the ‘not-free’ 
category of its ranking of independent countries, with due exception for Kuwait listed 
                                                 
6 Dugulin, op.cit., p. 10. 
7 Khader, op.cit., p. 40. 
8 With the exception of Bahrain that accounts for only 5% of the GCC GDP. “Executive Focus: 
Gerd Nonneman, Dean, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar”, The Prospect 
Group, 8 January 2012. 
9 “The GCC: Process and Achievement”, The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the 
Gulf, Secretariat General, Riyadh, Information Centre, 2009, 4th edn., p. 65. 
10 Ibid., p. 92. 
11 C. Hanelt, “The Middle East as a Region of Opportunity”, Spotlight Europe, November 2010.  
12 The six GCC countries, the Kingdom of Morocco and the Kingdom of Jordan. The last two 
have been officially invited to join the Council, even if enlargement does not appar realistic 
in the short run. “Executive focus: Gerd Nonneman”, op.cit.; S. Al Qassemi, “An expanded 
GCC: Challenges and Opportunities”, Gulf News, 11 May 2011.  BRIGG Paper 3/2012 
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as ‘partially free’.13 At the same time, the GCC countries’ political and economic 
power puts them in  the spotlight of the international community and of  non-
governmental organizations (NGOs). The latter have increased their presence on the 
ground14 and are publishing considerably more reports about serious violations of 
human rights taking place in the region.  
 
During the last 18  months, protests have increased enormously in the Gulf. For 
example, the detaining of five prisoners of conscience in the UAE in 2011 led to calls 
for urgent action by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. Known as the 
“UAE 5”, the five men were jailed for almost eight months, following some comments 
published in the online political forum UAE Hewar.15 They were charged with the 
offense of “insulting officials” under article 176 of the country’s penal code,16 and the 
online forum was eventually banned by authorities. Amnesty International earlier this 
year published a press release to raise awareness about six men still languishing in jail 
in Saudi Arabia one year after their arrest. 17 They were jailed because they tried to 
organize the “Day of Rage” in Riyadh. Moreover, Amnesty reported that at least one 
of the detainees “was tortured or otherwise ill-treated after being detained”.18  
 
Although the human rights record points to an imminent upheaval, many Gulf 
commentators and scholars hold a different view. For instance, Abdullah warns not 
to expect anything comparable to what has happened in Egypt or Tunisia because 
there is currently  no room for political change. 19 Al Qassemi argues that  the 
“centuries-old tribal nature of the Gulf societies ensures that authority is by tradition 
delegated to a tribal chief”. 20 A  strong intellectual class and the omnipresent 
religious authority, through their fatwas, are the main obstacles towards any reforms.  
 
                                                 
13 Freedom House, “Combined Average Ratings – Independent Countries”, 2011. 
14 In the last few years, major NGOs have been invited by the sovereigns to set up human 
rights commissions. For instance, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia in 2005 “invited both Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch to send their inspectors to Riyadh”. R. Lacey, Inside 
the Kingdom, London, Arrow Books, 2009, pp. 271-272. 
15 Human Rights Watch, “UAE: Expunge activists’ convictions”, 30 November 2011. 
16 Amnesty International, “Amnesty launches Edinburgh Festival campaign to ‘free the UAE 
5’”, 8 August 2011. 
17 Amnesty International, “Saudi Arabia: at least six men held for a year for intending to 
protest”, Press release, 9 March 2012. 
18 Ibid. 
19 “Al Jazeera interviews Dr. Abdulkhaleq Abdulla”, Al Jazeera Forum, 12 March 2011. 
20 S. Al Qassemi, “Reform in Arab Gulf  regimes is unattainable – for now”, The Guardian, 26 
January 2012. Cono Giardullo 
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The outbreak of the Arab Spring was also caused by underlying economic difficulties. 
The social contract between the sovereign and the citizens, where the government 
has the duty to provide employment, housing, healthcare and all the fundamental 
services related,21 had been breached.22 The other major reason is related to the 
perception of gross human rights violations.23  
 
The Gulf ‘momentum’ 
 
In the last few years, the Gulf states have acquired a primary role on the 
international stage. This recent success is the sum of many factors stemming from the 
past  –  such as the independence from the United Kingdom acquired only in the 
1970s  –  and from the present –  for instance, the strong personality of sovereigns 
leading these nations.  Moreover,  in the last few decades they  have stood as 
supporters of Western policies and they have provided “an anchor of stability in a 
troubled environment where peace has been repeatedly challenged”.24 
 
The Gulf countries, thanks to their immense gas and oil reserves, are “taking the lead, 
influencing events, assuming greater financial responsibilities, projecting 
socioeconomic confidence, and becoming increasingly conscious of their newly 
acquired status as a regional power”.25 According to The New York Times, the centre 
of gravity in the Arab region has moved towards the Gulf, and the United States is 
trying to adapt and take care at the same time of its interests, namely a facilitated 
access to the oil and gas reserves, a strong support to the fragile system in Iraq and a 
commitment to avoid Iran from developing the nuclear bomb.26  
 
                                                 
21 “The Arab Gulf States afford to postpone democracy as long as they deliver on 
socioeconomic, development and adhere to the welfare programmes as policy priorities”. A. 
Abdullah, “Contemporary socio-political issues of the Arab Gulf moment”, The Centre for the 
Study of Global Governance, September 2010, p. 19. 
22 B. Khader, "The Arab Spring: promises and challenges", lecture, Bruges, College of Europe, 
18 January 2012. It is also a matter of “unsustainability of the state” according to S. Colombo, 
“The GCC Countries and the Arab Spring: Between Outreach, Patronage And Repression”, 
IAI Working Papers, vol. 12, no. 09, Rome, Institute of International Affairs, March 2012, p. 3. 
23 An ‘Arab Spring model’ revolution in the Gulf countries would, according to Mishaal Al 
Gergawi,  result 80% from  economic problems and 20% from the perception of a lack of 
human rights. Interview with Mishaal Al Gergawi, Emirati affairs commentator and Gulf News 
columnist, via skype, 15 March 2012. 
24 “The EU and the GCC –  a new Partnership”, Policy Papers RSC,  no.  02/7, Florence, 
European University Institute, 2002, p. 6. 
25 Abdullah, op.cit., p. 1. 
26 R. Takeyh, “The Gulf Is Where It's At”, The New York Times, 8 February 2012. BRIGG Paper 3/2012 
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The GCC countries’ rising consciousness regarding its global role has never been so 
high. According to Ambassador  Al Hamad, the GCC countries have a strategic 
location at the centre of a hotspot region,  and they are  in a strong position to 
contribute to building a secure and stable Middle East.27 Economically, the GCC 
countries perform consistently well. “[T]he World Bank has classified their economies 
among the best performing, with an average of 5.8 per cent annual growth during 
the first decade of the twenty-first century.”28 Qatar, as the fastest-growing country 
of the region, is leading the progress of the GCC countries. In the European press 
Qatar has been defined as a “mammouth par la force de frappe diplomatique et 
économique”29 as well as a “pigmy with a punch of a giant”.30 
 
The reasons for the Gulf ‘momentum’ are mostly pragmatic when it comes to the 
untiring defence of the Arab world. Nonneman rightly points out the necessity for 
most of the GCC countries to gain diplomatic leverage, due to their small size, and 
he argues that they can best achieve this by improving their country’s ‘brand’ and 
recognition profile on the international stage.31 
 
What interest for the GCC in the Arab Spring? 
 
Libya was the first case where Qatar played a primary role, side by side with much 
more powerful  allies  such  as France, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
Qatar was the first Arab country supporting the UN Resolution establishing a no-fly 
zone over Libya in March 2011.32 “Its muscles, in the form of weapons, cash, fuel, 
airlift, six fighter-bombers, 100-plus field advisers and vigorous diplomacy, bolstered 
NATO’s bombers and drones and helped oust Colonel Qaddafi.”33 As a matter of 
fact, Qatar  was the bank of Libyan rebels during the revolution, 34 pledging an 
estimated $400-500 million of the total $2-3 billion asked for by the rebels. As a result, 
Qatari ruler Sheikh Al-Thani was jokingly nicknamed as “Emir of Qatar and Libya”.35 
 
                                                 
27 Interview with Ambassador  Al Hamad, Ambassador of GCC Delegation in Brussels, via 
email, 5 & 14 March 2012. 
28 Abdullah, op.cit., p. 2. 
29 B. Barthe, “Le Qatar à la conquête du monde”, Le Monde – Géo & Politique, 27 February 
2012, p. 4. 
30 “Pigmy with the punch of a giant”, The Economist, 5 November 2011. 
31 “Executive focus:  Gerd Nonneman”, op.cit. 
32 “Special Report – Qatar’s big Libya adventure”, Reuters Africa, 9 June 2011. 
33 “Pigmy with the punch of a giant”, op.cit.  
34 “Qatar asserts its diplomatic clout”, Al Jazeera, 1 February 2012. 
35 “Special Report – Qatar’s big Libya adventure”, op.cit. Cono Giardullo 
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Bahrain was a more complex case, as the tiny Kingdom is part of the GCC countries 
and strategically fully dependent on Saudi Arabia. In March 2011, 1.500 members of 
Saudi Arabia’s National Guard marched towards Manama, capital of Bahrain, in 
order to violently hush thousands  of peaceful protesters asking for democratic 
change.36 The Saudi troops, joined by UAE police forces, were marching under the 
banner of the GCC.37  
 
In Yemen, the GCC has been pushing forward for six months the implementing 
mechanism, finally signed by President Saleh in Riyadh on 23 November 2011. This 
was another major diplomatic achievement for the Gulf states.  The success is 
particularly valuable for Saudi Arabia, which wanted to handle the crisis in order to 
avoid any kind of revolutionary spill-over. "From a diplomatic standpoint [the GCC 
initiative] is an acceptable solution”,38 because it obliged President Saleh to resign 
and transfer his powers to Vice-President Abd Rabu Mansour Hadi. Nevertheless, 
many complaints have been expressed  by  the opposition  side  regarding  the 
personal immunity assured to Saleh. The GCC initiative showed to the rest of the 
world their democratic commitment. At the same time, it kept the balance of power 
in the region, preventing youth and civic movements from gaining  a  powerful 
position in the new government.39 
 
Currently, the Syrian situation is mobilizing human rights activists around the world. 
The GCC countries have been continuously mustering  their political weight and 
delivering humanitarian aid during the  last  several  months. They expelled, on 7 
February  2011,  the Syrian ambassadors from their capitals “in protest at the 
continued brutal repression of protests aimed at toppling Bashar Al Assad”.40 They 
have also abandoned the Arab League plan in Syria as it seemed to them “the 
mission was turning a blind eye to regime atrocities”.41 At the end of February 2012, 
the Prime Minister of Qatar proposed to arm the Syrian rebels, to solve the impasse in 
which the UN Security Council has found itself hamstrung by the veto of China and 
                                                 
36 T.C. Jones, “Saudi Arabia versus the Arab spring”, Raritan, a Quarterly Review, 2011, pp. 43-
59. 
37 High officers of UAE forces, Dubai Police, have refused any implication in the affair 
38 A. Alwazir, “Yemen’s GCC initiative: Cosmetic or Comprehensive change?”, Al Akhbar, 30 
November 2011. 
39 Ibid. 
40 P. Sands, “Damascus faces diplomatic isolation as Gulf states expel Syrian envoys”, The 
National, 8 February 2012.  
41 Ibid. BRIGG Paper 3/2012 
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Russia on the tabled resolutions. Qatar, backed by Saudi Arabia, has been asking for 
international support to stop the killings of civilians.42  
 
From a political perspective, the Gulf countries, above all the UAE and Saudi Arabia, 
fear the rising power of the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamist parties in the post-Arab 
Spring elections. During the last few months, new contacts have been established 
between the sovereigns of GCC and the Muslim Brotherhood party in Egypt. So far, 
the political party enjoys a semi-recognized status only in Bahrain and in Kuwait.43 
Concerning the relations with the UAE, the Muslim Brotherhood is willing to establish 
good relations with this country, also taking into account the great amount of 
investments of the Emirates in Egypt.44  
 
Another  reason  for a stronger diplomatic action by  the Gulf countries are  the 
enormous foreign investments that have been put in place over the last years. The 
economic figures show investments amounting  to over $110 billion between 2003 
and 2008 in the Arab region. 45 A comparison of these investments to those  of 
European countries is striking, considering that “an average Gulf investment in the 
MENA is $268 million compared to $70 million from Europe”.46  
 
To sum up, the GCC countries have reached the stage of a “key global player which 
has a pivotal role in solving global challenges”.47 For the first time, the Gulf states are 
conscious of their role and they want to use it to foster their strategy. This strategy 
consists  of:  avoiding  Arab Spring  spill-over, as they “have witnessed some sort of 
public protest in one form or another”48 also in the Gulf region;  playing a primary role 
in all Arabic regional  dossiers, to protect  their investments and increase their 
influence among Arab countries;  and,  finally,  diversifying  their economy.  The UAE 
                                                 
42 “Qatar PM calls for arming Syrian rebels”, Reuters, 27 February 2012. 
43 S. Al Qassemi, “Will Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood mend ties with Gulf States?”, Egypt 
Independent, 7 February 2012. 
44 For further details see C. Giardullo, The GCC as a new global actor in the Arab turmoil: A 
renewed dialogue between the EU and the Gulf countries, Master’s thesis, Bruges, College of 
Europe, 2012, p. 14. 
45 E. Burke, A. Echagüe & R. Youngs, “Why the European Union needs a ‘broader Middle East 
policy”, FRIDE Working Paper, no. 93, Madrid, February 2010, p. 2. 
46 P. Henry, S. Abdelkarim and B. de Saint-Laurent, ‘Foreign direct investment into MEDA in 
2007: the switch’, ANIMA Investment Network, 2008, cited in E. Burke & S. Bazoobandi, “The 
Gulf takes charge in the MENA region”, FRIDE, Working paper, no. 97, Madrid, April 2010, p. 5. 
47 T. Renard, "The Treachery Of Strategies: A Call For True EU Strategic Partnerships", EGMONT, 
Paper, no. 45, Brussels, April 2011, p. 5. 
48 Colombo, op.cit., p. 2. Cono Giardullo 
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and Qatar are paving the way for the coming decades, when they will not be able 
to rely as much on oil and gas reserves. 
 
Enhancement of the EU’s involvement in the post-Arab Spring Gulf 
 
This part analyzes the major stakes around the EU-GCC relationship and the reaction 
of the EU to the Arab Spring, through its policies, in the Gulf. 
 
EU-GCC relations: between ‘momentum’ and little ambition 
 
The GCC and the EU were set up with different priorities. The former was created “as 
an inter-governmental institution with the emphasis on cooperation rather than 
integration”,49 while the latter has “always [been] looking for ways in which actual 
integration can be fostered”.50 The institutional relationship between the EU51 and the 
GCC was established through a Cooperation Agreement that was signed in 1988, 
with the main objectives of “strengthening stability in a region of strategic 
importance and to facilitate political, trade and economic relations”. 52  The 
Agreement was not very  ambitious, 53 as  it pursued the specific aim of starting 
institutional relations and merely fostering regional integration.54 
 
The Agreement establishes joint institutions such as the Joint Council and the Joint 
Cooperation Committee as the backbone of the relations between the two regional 
organizations. Moreover, the Cooperation Agreement called for the signing of a Free 
Trade Agreement.  However, the two parties have faced many  hurdles  in the 
negotiations of a new agreement.55  
 
                                                 
49 C. Koch, “Limited Possibilities: Defining the Interaction between the EU and the GCC”, in B. 
Balamir-Coskun & B. Demirtas-Coskun (eds.), Neighborhood Challenge – The European Union 
and its Neighbors, Boca Raton, Universal Publishers, 2009, p. 166. 
50 Ibid.  
51 At the time the European Economic Community. 
52 “Political and economic relations”, EU Delegation. 
53  “The EU-GCC Cooperation agreement lies at the lowest rank of the EU economic 
preferences pyramid [...] do[es] not include any tariff preference, with both the EU and the 
GCC granted each other Most Favored Nation Treatment”, N.K. El-Amir, “Towards a Security 
Transregional Relations between the EU and the GCC: Possibilities and Obstacles”, Workshop 
organized by the Gulf Research Center, European University Institute, Montecatini Terme, 21-
25 March 2007, p. 12. 
54 “EMPHASIZING the fundamental importance attached by the parties to consolidating and 
strengthening regional integration”, Official Journal, L 054 , 25 February 1989, p. 1. 
55 For further details see Giardullo, op.cit., p. 17. BRIGG Paper 3/2012 
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The backbone of EU-GCC relations  are  the annual Joint Council meetings  at 
Ministerial level. They have been held alternatively in the Gulf countries and in 
Europe and they have provided the basis for developing  the partnership. 
Momentum was reached again in 2010, with the establishment of a Joint Action 
Programme (JAP) (2010-2013)56 for the implementation of the EU-GCC Cooperation 
Agreement. It strengthened cooperation in 14 sectors57 and “must be regarded as a 
very positive step”, which aims to “expand the relationship to also include the private 
sector, research institutions, universities and other nongovernmental actors”.58 
 
The Joint Action Programme has fostered many projects. For instance, in the field of 
‘higher education and scientific research’, Erasmus Mundus scholarships have been 
established59 for the exchange of students with several Gulf universities. 60 The “GCC 
cultural days” have been organized in seven different European capitals, and the 
“EU cultural days” were held for the first time in Riyadh. 
 
At the  Joint Council held in Luxembourg in June 2012  the parties “commended 
progress achieved through the  implementation of the 2010-2013 EU-GCC Joint 
Action Programme [and ...] agreed to the preparation of a joint work programme for 
the next period (2013-2016)”.61 The Joint Council discussed mostly regional security 
issues, due to the on-going protests and adjustment process throughout the Arab 
region,  notably the Middle East Peace Process, Syria, Iran, Iraq and Yemen. The 
parties agreed to hold the next meeting in Bahrain in 2013. 
 
                                                 
56 “Joint Action Programme for Implementation of GCC-EU Cooperation Agreement of 1988”, 
2010-2013. 
57 In particular “economic, financial and monetary cooperation”, “investment”, “trade and 
cooperation”, “energy”, “transport”, “environment and climate change”, “industry”, 
“combating money laundering and terrorist financing”, “intellectual property rights”, 
“telecommunications and information technology sector”, “higher education and scientific 
research”, “tourism”, “cultural and mutual understanding”, “antiquities and museum”. Ibid. 
58 M. Bauer & R. Rieger, “Enhancing Interregional Partnership: Europe and the Gulf” in E. Ratka 
and O. Spaiser (eds.), Understanding European Neighbourhood Policies: Concepts, Actors, 
Perceptions, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2012, p. 185. 
59 There has not been a large success so far for these scholarships. The reason lies in the small 
economic sum granted through the scholarships by the EU, if compared to the Gulf standard, 
Interview with an official, Arabian Peninsula, Iran, Iraq Division, EEAS, via telephone, 30 March 
2012; Interview with an official, European Parliament, Brussels, 23 April 2012. 
60 University of Bahrein, Sultan Qaboos University in Oman, the University of Qatar, Zayed 
University and Nuzwa University in the UAE. Interview with Ambassador Al Hamad, op.cit. 
61 “22nd EU-GCC Joint Council and Ministerial Meeting Luxembourg”, 25 June 2012. Cono Giardullo 
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EU-GCC FTA: a “missing milestone”62 to boost further relations 
 
The GCC admires the EU’s regional economic integration. According to Ambassador 
Al Hamad, the EU serves as a model of economic and monetary integration for the 
GCC, despite its current crisis, and the GCC can learn from its experience, success 
and shortfalls.63 During the summit of the GCC in Riyadh on 20 December 2011, King 
Abdullah said: “I ask today that we move from a phase of cooperation to a phase of 
Union within a single entity”.64  
 
The aspiration is even clearer when one looks at the effort of the Gulf countries to 
establish a Gulf Dinar,65 a common currency, initially forecast for 2010 and now 
delayed. Moreover, the GCC “has adopted the same convergence criteria stated in 
the Maastricht treaty for the EU, namely, interest rate, inflation rate, public debt as 
well as  the public deficit”, 66 and the upcoming Gulf System Central Bank will 
eventually follow the EU system, “i.e., a central banking system including the Gulf 
Central Bank as well as the National Central Banks”.67 
 
Furthermore, some government officials from the General Secretariat of the GCC 
have been sent to Luxembourg to study the functioning of EUROSTAT in order to 
improve the common statistics  services. The Gulf countries are well aware of the 
problems the EU is facing with the crisis, but after having studied various models of 
economic integration, they came to the conclusion that the “European one is the 
best”.68 
 
The deadlock rests on all the disputes that occurred in the EU-GCC FTA negotiations. 
Notwithstanding the intensity of bilateral trade that ranks the GCC as the EU’s 6th 
trading partner and the EU as the GCC’s main trading partner, no agreement has 
been reached so far. The European Commission effectively re-launched negotiations 
on the EU-GCC FTA in 2002, with the goal of reinforcing a new regional market and 
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64 “Saudi King Abdullah urges GCC ‘to move from phase of cooperation to phase of union”, 
Al Arabiya, 20 December 2011 [emphasis added]. 
65 Also called Khaleeji Dinar. 
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bringing it closer to the EU market. Since 2007, the EU Commission has been very 
close to concluding an agreement that will not only be an important region-to-
region FTA in the global trading system, but it will also open doors for new 
investments  and new trade beyond what the EU and the GCC offer each other 
through the World Trade Organization.69 
 
The FTA would not only improve economic relations. It also has a great potential to 
enhance a stronger partnership with the Gulf. For instance “[t]he EU’s proposal for a 
Memorandum of Understanding on energy cooperation has been rejected by the 
GCC countries, insisting that an FTA is the precursor to deepening other areas of 
cooperation”.70 Finally, as the EU has concentrated its efforts so far in the region on 
economic and trade matters, the achievement of a coherent strategy “has been 
overshadowed as a result of the stalemate in the FTA negotiations”.71 
 
Although  there is some  admiration  for  the EU’s  economic integration model, the 
GCC countries are looking elsewhere to further enhance strategic and economic 
relationships. The GCC has already signed FTAs with Singapore, New Zealand and 
the European Free Trade Association  (EFTA), while it is negotiating new FTAs  with 
other important regional and influential countries such as China, India and Turkey.72 
 
The EU’s Gulf Strategy: strategic concerns and priorities 
 
In the past years, the EU has created many subcategories in its approach towards 
the Arab region. “[The] European policy is still divided into separate ‘policy blocs’. 
[...] The disjuncture between the Mediterranean and Gulf components is especially 
notable”.73 The Arab Spring could be a unique opportunity for the EU “to rethink the 
artificial compartmentalization of its policies and finally develop a single regional 
framework”.74 A singular strategy does not imply an absolute equality in relations and 
approach, but more broadly it means a substantive use of “the principle of 
                                                 
69 Interview with an official, DG Trade, European Commission, via e-mail, 18 April 2012. 
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differentiation”75 at least in the three macro sub-regional areas of the  Maghreb, 
Mashreq and the Gulf.76 A new strategy is even more necessary towards the GCC as 
“[t]he nature of Gulf polities has allowed little scope for the kind of economic and 
social bottom-up engagement which characterises EU external policy”. 77 With the 
recent increase in GCC investments in the Mediterranean region, the EU will need to 
foster a regional framework for economic integration.78  
 
The reaction of the European Union to the Arab Spring cannot be clearly defined so 
far, and the EU’s strategy in the Gulf remains unsettled.79 It oscillates between waiting 
for “the settling down of the Arab spring”80 and a ‘pro-active aptitude’ as the role of 
the EU “is set to become more central and relevant” in the  entire  region.81 As 
confirmed by Abdullah, “Europe, regardless of the difficult time it is going through 
and the crisis, has always been influential to us and the world”.82  
 
A strategic partnership83 between the Gulf and the EU would help secure energy 
supplies and reach a closer mutual understanding,84 but it has not been developed 
yet for the GCC.  85 In formulating its response to recent developments, the EU will 
need to take into account the new actors in the region, the Gulf countries. This is due 
to the fact that “some of the Gulf States are facing their own protests and demands 
for political reform, their present governments have a distinct interest in seeing the 
Arab world return to peaceful political processes”. 86  The stakes around this 
partnership are not only cultural or economic. It can be argued that the main 
                                                 
75 Ibid., p. 114. 
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strategic concerns and priorities are related to regional security issues. The first dossier 
is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. “Both the EU and the GCC perceive the conflict as a 
relevant factor in their security”.87 According to Bauer and Rieger, this conflict is of a 
threefold interest for the Gulf states:  
 
1) the Gulf monarchies have an important strategic interest in a peaceful conflict 
settlement [...] 
2) the Gulf state regimes have a genuine interest in a significant improvement of the 
Palestinian people’s living conditions [...] 
3) the GCC countries have an economic interest in a normalisation of relations with 
Israel.88 
 
Finally,  “a pro-active GCC working in concert with the EU can provide tangible 
benefits for the overall stability of the Middle Eastern region”.89 In order to achieve 
this result, the GCC has to be reassured by the EU about the “growing 
consciousness”  that  “has  emerged within the institutions of the European Union 
about the Gulf’s strategic importance”.90 The GCC countries  “want their interest 
reflected in other policy circles [...and] to become part of the mainstream 
debate”.91  
 
The EEAS and the European Parliament pushing for a Gulf Strategy  
 
Notwithstanding the growing interest of the GCC in Asian markets and alliances92 
and a renewed US security and economic strategy in the region, the EEAS and the 
European Parliament are struggling to foster a more concrete partnership with the 
Gulf countries. The European Parliament published in March 2011 a resolution “on 
European relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council”.93 The resolution was released 
in the midst of the Arab uprisings and it is the most advanced analysis of the current 
relations  between the two regional organizations. The European Parliament 
                                                 
87 R. Aliboni, “EU and GCC Strategic Interests in the Mediterranean: Convergence and 
Divergence”, in Roberto Aliboni (ed.), The Mediterranean Opportunities to Develop EU-GCC 
Relations, Rome, Istituto Affari Internazionali, June 2010, p. 73. 
88 Bauer & Rieger, op.cit., p. 179. 
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emphasized the importance of signing the FTA because “such an agreement will 
constitute mutual recognition of the credibility of two entities that have chosen the 
path of multilateralism and integration”.94 The resolution also “asks the EU to initiate a 
strategic dialogue with the GCC [...] on regional security issues [...] (the Middle East 
peace process, Iran’s nuclear programme, the stabilisation of Iraq, Yemen and 
Darfur)”95 and in the same spirit calls “on the EU and the GCC to step up joint efforts 
to bring about a negotiated end to the occupation of the Palestinian Territories 
[…and it] suggests in this regard more regular cooperation between the Quartet and 
the Arab League monitoring committee”.96 
 
Moreover, the European Parliament stressed the necessity of a strategic partnership, 
given the role of the two organizations97 on the international scene and “highlights 
the importance, to that end, of introducing periodic summit meetings of heads of 
state and government, independently of the progress of ongoing negotiations”.98 In 
addition, it requests the setting up of  an EU  delegation in each of the six GCC 
member states99 in the region,  “thereby helping to raise the profile of the EU”.100 
Towards this end, another EU delegation might be opened in 2013 in the region. 101 
 
The High  Representative  was the first to stress that  the JAP (2010-2013)  “confirms 
aspirations from both sides to have a more strategic relationship”.102 She delivered 
the same message again in 2011  at  the Joint Council, when she underlined  that 
“recent developments in North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula are a clear 
demonstration of the need for closer dialogue between the EU and GCC”.103 
 
                                                 
94 Ibid., point 1. 
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Moreover, Baroness Ashton has intensified meetings with her counterpart, the GCC 
Secretary Dr. Abdullatif bin Rashid Al-Zayani.104 During their meeting in January 2012 
they shared their concerns about Syria, Iran and Yemen and EU-GCC relations. Once 
again, the HR stressed her determination “to intensify our dialogue and cooperation 
on many matters of common interest”.105  
 
As some commentators have noted, the real challenge now “will be on keeping the 
momentum going”.106 The visit of the GCC Secretary shows the interest in fostering a 
stronger relationship from the Gulf side and also underscores “the increased 
attention that is being paid to the Gulf region by the European Union [and the ...] 
recognition that the GCC is gaining as an organization committed and contributing 
to promoting security and stability”.107 
 
A stalling strategy? And yet it does move! 
 
In light of the new regional role that the Gulf countries have acquired, the EU should 
show a major interest in dealing with the GCC. The EU policy in the region is still 
divided into three ‘policy blocks’:  The first covers the Mediterranean, the second 
includes the Gulf and the third one comprises Iraq, Iran and Yemen.108 A strategic 
partnership would allow the EU to work “outside the bilateral framework [and ...i]t 
would be more helpful to think in terms of triangulation and variable geometry”109 
with the Mediterranean area.  Triangulation refers “to cooperation in third regions 
where the EU and its partners have mutual, if not common, interests".110 Furthermore, 
it would be a good  starting point to  evaluate  the merging of all EU policies 
throughout the region in a common partnership with the Arab countries. 
 
In fact, the 2004 Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East 
(SPMME) was a first step to overcome the fragmentation of EU frameworks towards 
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the MENA region.111 The SPMME embraces the countries of North Africa, the GCC, 
Yemen, Iraq and Iran. However, it still distinguishes the countries of the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership from those east of Jordan. The initial proposal from the 
Commission and High Representative to envisage a possible regional strategy for the 
Wider Middle East was not followed up.112 
 
A new condensed strategy could be profitable for both the EU and the GCC in 
many domains, as for instance: 1) Iraq, Iran and regional security; 2) the  Israeli-
Palestinian conflict; 3) improving trade exchanges; 4) a  common and stronger 
response to the financial crisis; 5) energy supplies; and 6) counter-terrorism.113 In 2012 
the EU intensified the dialogue with the GCC “to inject greater strategic depth into 
EU-GCC relations to guide the preparation of the next programme”. 114  More 
exchanges and cooperation are needed to reach a shared model of economic 
sustainability and inclusive development.115 
 
Conclusion: towards a strategic partnership? 
 
This paper has examined to what extent the policies of the European Union in the 
Gulf have changed since the beginning of the Arab Spring. Despite the challenges 
ahead and despite the calls by the European Parliament and by Baroness Ashton to 
upgrade the relationship, the EU’s new Gulf Strategy after the Arab Spring has not 
taken shape yet. The EU has been, and will remain, a crucial partner for the GCC, 
but this partnership lacks strategic vision.116 This paper has shed light on the difficult 
challenges that the EU faces in establishing a strategic partnership with the GCC. 
Yet, such a reinforced partnership that merges the various EU policies in the region 
into a single strategic partnership with the Arab countries would be in the interest of 
both sides. A reinforced relationship between the two regional organizations is also 
useful to work in terms of ‘triangulation’  with the Mediterranean countries.  Until 
today, the EU approach treats the MENA region as a collection of divided blocs such 
as: a) the Mediterranean; b) the Gulf and c) Iraq, Iran and Yemen.   
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The major reason for the EU to establish a strategic partnership with the GCC is the 
growing regional power acquired by the Arab monarchies. A persistent deadlock of 
the negotiations on the FTA has blocked any progress. The EU should overcome its 
long-standing ‘strategic neglect’ of the region. Despite frequent meetings that have 
been taken place between Baroness Ashton, the GCC Secretary General, and other 
high level politicians of the Gulf,117 no major result has so far been achieved. 
 
The EU’s most likely course of action is not to propose a strategic partnership straight 
away. However, it may begin these talks before agreeing on the next JAP (2014-
2017) at the Joint Council in 2013. Moreover, it is in the EU’s interests to try to further a 
political dialogue and to definitely close the FTA question, also scheduling a second 
visit to the Gulf by Commissioner De Gucht in the following months. Finally, specific 
EU actions that could prove fruitful in the current context include: 
−  Increasing the EEAS and EU delegation staff working on the GCC countries.118 
−  Improving communication through specific people-to-people exchanges which 
help to increase the visibility of the EU in the region, as the EU is most of the time 
perceived as “a group of 27 Countries”119 and not like a single entity. 
−  Broaden the political dialogue between the EU and the GCC through sending 
out Electoral Observation Missions (EOM).120 These missions, whose goal is also to 
‘strengthen respect for human rights’ have been on the cutting-edge of the EU 
promotion of human  rights. European Electoral Observers have been sent 
throughout  the world, to about 40 countries, in the last few years. The only 
obstacle to the deployment of these missions is the necessary formal invitation of 
the host countries.121  
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